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Abstract 
This paper discusses the effects of small banks on economic growth. We first theoretically 
show that small banks operating at a regional level can spur local economic growth. As 
compared with big interregional banks, small regional banks are more effective in promoting 
local economic growth, especially in regions with lower initial endowments and severe credit 
rationing. We then test the model predictions using a sample of German banks and 
corresponding regional statistics. We find that small regional banks are more important 
funding providers in regions with low access to finance. The empirical results support the 
theoretical hypotheses. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Banking systems have experienced a trend toward greater market concentration and a decline 
in the number of banks in recent decades. Driven by market power (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004, 2005; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009; Koetter et al., 2012), scale economy (Berger, 1995; 
DeYoung et al., 2009; DeYoung, 2012; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012) and too-big-to-fail 
motives (Mishkin, 2006; Kane, 2000; Stolz and Wedow, 2010; Laeven and Valencia, 2010; 
Carow et al. 2011) banks have become larger.
1
 However, these big, complex, and 
increasingly opaque banks exploited financial safety nets and took risks that endangered 
economies (Blinder, 2010; Feldman and Stern, 2010; Liikanen, 2012; IMF, 2013). The 
widespread bailout of big banks during the recent financial crisis introduced the possibility of 
break-ups post-crisis, and this has turned analysts’ attentions to the role of small banks in 
local economies (Buiter, 2009; Rosenblum, 2011). Ring-fencing proposals in Europe and a de 
facto fence around foreign banks in the U.S. have addressed some policy concerns regarding 
big banks. In contrast, small local and regional banks often have limited access to 
government safety nets and mainly focus on financing individuals/households, as well as 
small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
2
 A major concern regarding small local and 
                                                          
1
 Higher credit ratings and lower funding costs may also be related to access to government safety nets (Brewer 
and Jagtiani, 2013). The rapid growth in investment banking and the “originate-to-distribute” securitization 
model also encouraged banking sector consolidation as well as moral hazard, thereby resulting in excessive risk-
taking (Blinder, 2010; Feldman and Stern, 2010). There is some evidence also that big banks have more volatile 
returns (Goddard et al., 2004).  
2
 In Germany, however, some small banks are protected by insurance funds run by the Bundesverband der 
Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken (cooperative banks) and the Savings Bank Association (DSGV) (savings banks). 
These offer institution protection schemes to their members. Also, the German savings bank sector had a 
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regional banks is that they are believed to be weak at loan diversification, as highlighted in 
the 1980s S&L crisis in the U.S., when more than 700 primarily small S&Ls failed. In 
Europe, however, certain small banks, such as savings banks and co-operative banks, can 
diversify their loan portfolios as they are organized under central entities that pool risk 
management and risk-sharing strategies. Multi-bank loan pools are applied as an instrument 
that allows participating banks to share regional credit risk. Loan pools exploit the 
diversification benefits available to large banks by spreading risk over regional investments, 
while remaining independent and benefiting from local knowledge (Gintschel and Hackethal, 
2004). These pooling arrangements, coupled with  local knowledge and lower loan screening  
and debtor monitoring costs, can result  in small banks being  effective at promoting local and 
regional economic growth (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Bofondi and Gobbi, 2003). 
 
There is no clear empirical evidence of the differing effects between small local and regional 
banks and big interregional banks on local economic growth. Some empirical studies suggest 
that small banks with limited market power reduce SME financing constraints (Carbó-
Valverde et al., 2009; Degryse and Ongena, 2007). Based on data from Italy, Guiso et al. 
(2004) find that local financial development is positively associated with entry of new firms, 
increased competition, and economic growth. Berger et al. (2004) also argue that healthy 
community banks improve SME financing. In a recent paper, DeYoung et al. (2012) find that 
SMEs are especially reliant on community bank finance. However, they also argue that small 
banks can exacerbate economic downturns during recessions due to low diversification. An 
alternative empirical finding is by Beck et al. (2010), who show that an increase in intra-state 
bank M&As mitigated regional income inequality by affecting labor market conditions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
government guarantee until 2001 (Gropp et al., 2013; Fischer et al., 2012). 
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These conflicting views raise questions about the role of bank size on firm-financing and 
economic development. 
 
Since previous studies have not addressed the question whether small banks or big banks are 
more efficient at promoting local economic growth, our work aims at providing evidence on 
this issue. In particular, we try to answer the question whether small regional banks are more 
efficient in promoting local economic growth as compared to big interregional banks. To the 
best of our knowledge, our work is the first to explicitly account for the different roles of 
regional versus interregional banks in assessing the effectiveness of financial development on 
economic growth. Our results are in line with Guiso et al. (2004), in that local financial 
development matters for economic growth. We further demonstrate that regional financial 
development is especially important for relatively poor regions in an integrated economy, 
mainly due to problems associated with attracting interregional financing. 
 
In our paper, we first develop an overlapping generations model that builds on the work by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and includes small regional banks in a setting of financial 
development and economic growth. There is some theoretical literature on the impact of 
financial development on regional growth. In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), for instance, 
banks produce information, which improves the allocation of resources and fosters growth. 
As a larger number of firms use bank services, banks become more efficient, which feeds into 
development. Levine (1991) has a growth model based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) that 
focuses on liquidity shocks, which also shows that financial development entails higher 
growth. Morales (2003) develops a Schumpeterian model that focuses on creative destruction 
and the role of banks. The paper shows that a policy that incentivizes financial intermediary 
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monitoring activity can improve economic growth due to reduced moral hazard.  The 
literature on the role of regional financial institutions on growth is, however, relatively 
sparse. The paper closest to ours is probably Boyd and Smith (1997). In their model, 
entrepreneurs from two regions suffer from a state verification problem. In the absence of 
interregional capital flows, both regions converge to the same output level. With capital 
flows, the richer region finds it easier to attract new capital, and there is no convergence. 
Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) theoretically examine the role of bank size on real economic 
development, arguing that small regional institutions can give local entrepreneurs a 
competitive edge and promote local economic growth in underdeveloped regions. However, 
their model is static. Our theoretical model extends the aforementioned literature in three 
main ways. First, we explicitly combine elements of both regional financial development and 
economic growth in a comparative static equilibrium model. Second, we show that the effect 
of regional bank development on economic growth is conditional on the state of economy, 
with small bank development becoming more important for regions with lower initial 
endowments and severe credit rationing. Finally, unlike the earlier literature, we differentiate 
between the roles of small regional banks and big interregional banks on local economic 
growth. We find that small regional banks are more effective in promoting local economic 
growth, especially in underdeveloped regions.  
 
We then empirically test these predictions on a sample of 457 German savings banks and 
corresponding regional statistics over 1995 to 2004. We use German data for two reasons. 
First, focusing on a single country limits the unobserved heterogeneity in the sample. Second, 
Germany has a strong local banking sector. German savings banks (Sparkasse) follow a 
regional principle; they operate predominantly within their own region and typically do not 
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compete with other regions’ savings banks. The regions in which the savings banks operate 
are easily identifiable and are closely linked to German administrative districts, called 
counties (Kreise). Counties are the second smallest administrative units that provide 
macroeconomic data on a regular basis. Therefore, a focus on Germany yields financial and 
macroeconomic data on a disaggregated level. Our empirical results reveal that small regional 
institutions, namely savings banks, play a prominent role in enhancing local economic 
development in under-developed regions. The results remain robust if we control for a variety 
of bank and region-specific effects, as well as alternative economic development measures. 
Based on these findings we argue that small local and regional banks can spur local economic 
growth.  
 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and derives various 
predictions. In section 3 we outline the empirical methodology and the sample and then 
present the results, including robustness tests. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL  
 
2.1. THE MODEL ENVIRONMENT  
 
In this section, we construct a growth model that stresses the role of small regional banks. 
The growth model is based on Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
and hence we use an overlapping generations framework. In addition, we allow capital to 
flow out of the region. Our economy is small and open so the interest rate is fixed. As a 
deviation from perfect financial markets, we assume that entrepreneurs suffer from a moral 
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hazard problem and that the scope of moral hazard can be reduced by bank monitoring.  
 
Consider an economy with an infinite sequence of two-period overlapping generations. At 
each date t = 0, 1, 2, …, a continuum of mass L = 1 of young agents is born. All agents live 
for two periods. They are risk-neutral, and care only about old-age consumption. In his first 
period, an agent works to earn money, which he invests. In the second period, an agent 
disinvests and consumes. There is a single final good that can either be consumed or used to 
build capital for the following period. Capital is produced by entrepreneurs using an 
indivisible capital production technology. This technology is modelled exactly as in Tirole 
(2006, chapter 9.2, based on Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997): each project requires I units of the 
final good and produces an expected return of R units of capital with probability p. The 
entrepreneur can decide whether to work or shirk. If he works, the probability of success is 
pH. If he shirks, the probability is pL, and the entrepreneur gets a private benefit B. The 
successes or failures of different entrepreneurs are stochastically independent, so there is no 
aggregate risk. The private benefit can be reduced to b < B if the entrepreneur is monitored by 
a bank. Bank monitoring costs are c per entrepreneur. The net present value of the project is 
positive if the entrepreneur behaves, and negative if he shirks. Assume that parameters are 
such that the entrepreneur can attract funds only if he is monitored (for example because B is 
large). The bank monitoring cost c is also a measure for regional bank efficiency in our 
model, with a higher c indicating lower bank efficiency. For now, this c is assumed to be 
exogenous. We will discuss endogenous bank efficiency below. 
 
If the entrepreneur is promised a sum Re from the return R, he will work if and only if pH Re ≥ 
pL Re + b, which is equivalent to  
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Re ≥  b/Δp                                                                        (IC) 
 
with Δp = pH – pL. Consequently, the bank and investor cannot demand more than R –
 Re = R – b/Δp from the entrepreneur, otherwise they would induce him to shirk. Thus the 
entrepreneur cannot credibly promise to pay back more than an expected Rp = pH (R – b/Δp), 
namely, the pledgeable part of the entrepreneur’s income.  
 
Capital is used to produce consumption goods for the next period. Let Kt be the capital stock 
at date t. Then the quantity of the final good output is Yt = F(Kt, L), following a neoclassical 
production function. For concreteness, assume that Yt = β Kt
α
 L
1−α
 = β Kt
α
. Hence, the 
complete production process takes two steps. First, final goods must be turned into capital by 
entrepreneurs. Second, capital in combination with labor is used to produce new final goods 
for consumption. 
 
In summary, the economy works as follows. A generation of agents earns wages while 
young. Agents need this income to save for future consumption. There are two different ways 
to save. An agent can either invest (that is, deposit) money at a bank, which then hands out 
the money to entrepreneurs in the form of loans and monitors these entrepreneurs. Otherwise, 
an agent can take out a loan, become an entrepreneur, and apply the capital production 
technology. Capital can then be used in the future to produce new final consumption goods. 
These consumption goods are used to repay the loan to the bank; the rest can be consumed by 
the now-old entrepreneur. However, production requires not only capital but also labor. 
Hence, entrepreneurs must pay out wages to the next generation; these wages will then be 
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saved for the next period production process. At this point, the model starts over again. 
 
For a bank, there are two alternative classes of investment. It can either hand out loans, as 
described above, or it can invest in an interregional financial market. For exposition, we 
assume that the region is considered to be a small open economy, and hence the interest rate r 
is exogenous. Investment in the financial market works as follows. One unit of final 
consumption goods from one period turns into 1 + r units of the final good in the following 
period. Alternatively, the region can also borrow from financial markets instead of investing. 
Of course, interest rates are endogenous and volatile in reality. Adding volatility would not 
change the model, because all agents in the model are risk-neutral. Having an exogenous 
interest rate is equivalent to assuming a small open economy, where the other regions are not 
modelled explicitly. In a larger model, one could have heterogeneous regions, some that 
borrow on the market, and some that lend. The aggregate interest rate r would be the same, 
and would be determined by the aggregate market clearing condition. In terms of German 
counties, the assumption of small open economies seems fair, as no single county can likely 
influence the world interest rate, or even the German interest rate level.  
 
Both capital and labor are assumed to be immobile between regions. As a consequence of 
capital immobility, interregional investment and borrowing is possible only with respect to 
the final consumption good. The assumptions that the final consumption good (money) is 
perfectly mobile and that labor is perfectly immobile are not crucial. However, labor needs to 
be less mobile than money; this assumption seems innocuous. Let us also assume that small 
regional banks invest only within their respective region, and call interregional banks those 
banks that also invest outside their respective region. Without loss of generality, one can 
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assume that interregional banks only invest outside their respective region.  
 
The structure of the regional economy, therefore, can be summarized as follows. 
Entrepreneurs use their capital to produce consumption goods. For capital production, they 
require financing, which they obtain from the regional banking system. Regional banks, in 
turn, refinance from regional investors (that is, depositors). Any remaining regional savings 
are invested at interregional banks, which then invest outside their region
3
. 
 
Importantly, there are two kinds of equilibrium. If the incentive constraint (IC) is binding, 
then entrepreneurs can earn a higher return than investors. In this case, there is credit 
rationing: investors would prefer to become entrepreneurs, but they cannot get a loan. To 
attract a loan, they would have to offer a higher interest rate, which would violate the 
incentive constraint. In the second kind of equilibrium, the incentive constraint is not binding, 
hence entrepreneurs and investors must earn the same expected return. Otherwise, some 
investors would prefer to start their own firms. We first discuss the equilibrium with a 
binding constraint (section 2.2). In section 2.3, we provide sufficient and necessary 
conditions for a binding constraint, and then discuss the second case.  
 
2.2. EQUILIBRIUM WITH BINDING INCENTIVE CONSTRAINT 
                                                          
3
 Regional banks are likely to be under-diversified. In our model, there is no aggregate risk, so diversification 
plays no role. However, in a model with regional risk factors, diversification would matter. There are two issues. 
Regional banks exposed to regional risk may suffer from regional shocks. This would dampen their growth path. 
Furthermore, undiversified banks may hold more equity (which is not in the current model). This would raise 
the financing costs of regional banks, indirectly leading to higher costs of lending c.  
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
Consider a region in which agents are initially endowed with consumption goods At. Agents 
can now try to borrow more from a bank to generate capital to produce more consumption 
goods. Assume for now that pledgeable income is small such that the incentive constraint 
(IC) is binding. Consequently, to obtain a loan, entrepreneurs must invest their own complete 
endowment At, and thus, they borrow the difference I −At from a regional bank.  
 
If banks grant nt loans altogether, the aggregate loan volume in the region is Ft = nt (I − At). 
The lending volume from regional banks Ft depends on regional bank efficiency, Ft = f(c). 
More efficient banks lead to better capital allocation and thus decreasing c has a positive 
effect on bank lending. From each loan, a bank receives the pledgeable portion Rp = pH (R – 
b/Δp) and the zero-profit condition implies that it repays Rp − c to investors (that is, 
depositors). The entrepreneur retains the non-pledgeable part pH R − Rp. After repayment, 
investors and entrepreneurs have an aggregate capital of  
 
     (    )                  (      )                                                             
 
Aggregate capital in the region is thus 
 
                                                                                            
 
This aggregate capital is now used to produce consumption goods by employing next 
period’s labor force. The labor market is competitive within each region, thus the equilibrium 
wage is 
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The net output of final consumption goods is 
 
          
          
      
      
        
                              
 
Of this aggregate output, a fraction Ki/(Ki + Ke) belongs to investors, and a fraction Ke/(Ki 
+Ke) to entrepreneurs. Now recall that as an alternative, banks could have invested abroad, in 
which case they may have offered an interest rate of r. Given that the financial system is 
competitive, an investment abroad must earn the same rate as an investment in the bank’s 
home region. Because investors have invested an aggregate Ft = nt (I − At) in the region, 
 
               
    
     
           
                                              
 
Solving for nt, 
 
    
 
     
√
        
           
   
                                               
 
Now if nt projects are financed, the aggregate amount of capital is given by (2), and the wage 
Wt is given by (3), thus 
 
           
          
        
  
 
 
 
13 
 
       (
  (    )
           
)
 
   
                                          
 
This wage Wt serves as assets for new projects for the young generation, with At+1 = Wt. Then 
a new period starts and the cycle begins anew. If Wt > At, the economy is growing; if Wt < At, 
the economy is shrinking. 
 
Let us discuss the financial system in more detail. Given that nt projects are financed within 
the region, there is an aggregate amount nt At of inside finance that is not channelled through 
the financial system. Each entrepreneur needs an additional I−At, and hence the aggregate 
amount of regional lending is Ft = nt (I −At). Now the region is inhabited by L = 1 agents 
each endowed with At, thus the difference At − nt At − nt (I − At) = At − nt I is invested 
outside the region by interregional banks. Importantly, there can be a capital outflow from 
less developed regions. Consider a poor region with low At. Then an entrepreneur requires a 
large amount of outside finance. The amount of pledgeable capital in relation to the amount 
of finance is then rather low. This low amount of pledgeable capital can only be compensated 
by high marginal productivity, which implies that it must be scarce. Hence, in equilibrium, 
the number of firms nt must be small. Thus, only a few firms receive financing, while part of 
the region’s savings is drained away from the bank’s respective region. 
 
2.3. EQUILIBRIUM WITH NON-BINDING INCENTIVE CONSTRAINT 
 
Before discussing the equilibrium, let us derive a condition for when the incentive constraint 
binds. If it does, returns are higher for an entrepreneur. An entrepreneur then invests At and 
 
 
 
14 
 
receives pH R − Rp; investors pay I − At to obtain Rp − c in return. Consequently, the 
incentive constraint binds if and only if  
 
      
  
 
    
    
  or equivalently 
     
      
     
                                                     (8)     
 
Now consider an economy with larger endowments, such that the incentive constraint is not 
binding. If there are nt firm in the region, the according investment is nt I. The return is an 
amount of capital Kt = nt (pH R – c), already taking into account the monitoring costs c. 
Because of the production function Yt = β Kt
α
 Lt
1–α
, the wage equals marginal productivity, 
Wt = β (1–α) Kt
α
 Lt
–α
 = β (1–α) Kt
α
, which implies a return of Yt – Lt Wt = β α Kt
α
. Now in 
equilibrium, the return must equal that from a risk-free investment, nt (1+r) I. As a 
consequence,  
 
             
        
    or equivalently, 
    √
          
      
   
                                                    (9)  
Because the incentive constraint does not bind, it becomes irrelevant. The friction on the 
capital market vanishes, and consequently, investment in the region is independent from its 
initial endowment At. Finally, calculate the wage level as  
    
   
 
         
   
 
√
        
       
   
                                (10) 
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2.4. COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS AND HYPOTHESES  
 
When the incentive Constraint (8) is not binding, Equation (9) implies that bank efficiency 
has a positive impact on the number of firms, and thus also on output (GDP), and (10) 
implies that bank efficiency increases the wage level. However, all these are level effects: 
more bank efficiency leads to a higher GDP, but not to higher GDP growth. Because the 
incentive constraint does not bind, the financial market works without friction, and output is 
only influenced by current bank efficiency.  
 
When the incentive constraint is binding, an increase in bank efficiency has three effects. 
First, less capital is consumed by the bank and more is left for the production of final goods. 
Second, more capital can be attracted from the global financial market. And third, the wage 
level increases. Consequently, in the next period, wealth in this region will be higher and 
entrepreneurs will find it easier to attract more funds. Hence, bank efficiency has a positive 
growth effect. Potentially, the region can grow until the incentive constraint ceases to bind. 
Putting both cases together, bank efficiency weakly increases growth.  
 
 
Proposition 1: A more efficient regional banking system spurs regional GDP growth, ∂(Yt − 
Yt−1)/∂c ≤ 0. 
 
Proofs are in the appendix. Now the second proposition follows the first one. If the initial 
endowment At is large, entrepreneurs are rich enough that the incentive constraint does not 
bind. In that case, bank efficiency has a positive effect on the level of output, but not on 
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growth. The smaller At, the higher the shadow price of the binding constraint. As a result, 
bank efficiency then has a larger effect on growth. Putting both cases together, the positive 
effect of bank efficiency on growth is smaller for richer regions (large At).  
 
If the incentive constraint were non-binding for all firms in all regions, then no firm would be 
credit constrained. Consequently, as argued above, there would be no relation between bank 
efficiency and growth. Realistically, some firms within each region suffer from borrowing 
constraints. The poorer the region, the more severe these constraints will be. This is exactly 
the precondition to test Proposition 2, which states that in a region with more initial assets At, 
an improvement of bank efficiency has a smaller impact on growth due to decreasing returns. 
 
Proposition 2: In a less developed region with lower At, the impact of an improvement in 
bank efficiency on economic growth is larger, ∂/∂At ∂(Yt − Yt−1)/∂c ≤ 0. 
 
In our model, we have treated bank efficiency as exogenous. The parameter c is a measure for 
the cost of banks, and hence implicitly also a measure of their comparative (dis)advantage. In 
reality, bank costs consist of many components, like screening costs and cost of capital.
4
 In 
our model, as in many others, c is treated as exogenous. Let us thus discuss what factors 
influence c. In principle, the past decisions of banks may have influenced c. For example, 
there may be “learning by doing”: larger banks may have learned more about how to monitor 
their borrowers, and thus have a lower c. Consequently, they will increase lending, fostering 
growth. There may be further consequences. Some banks, taking into account future cost 
                                                          
4
 In Germany, a country in which there is an implicit government guarantee, the cost of capital is lower for small 
regional savings banks. 
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reductions, will offer lower loan rates in order to attract volume. Both of these effects would 
be beneficial for growth in the region. As a result, the relaxation of the assumption of 
exogeneity of c does not adversely influence our results. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
3.1. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
In order to test the findings of our model, we focus on the German regional banking market, 
in which three bank types operate, namely, branches of big commercial banks,  savings 
banks, and  cooperative banks (Altunbas, et al. 2001; Schmidt and Tyrell, 2004; Hackethal, 
2004). Major commercial banks operate nationally, whereas local savings banks and credit 
cooperatives operate in regions where they are headquartered. The small size and 
independence of savings and credit cooperatives can give rise to a competitive advantage, 
specifically because of customer proximity and the capacity for quick decision-making in the 
local retail banking market (Slotty, 2009). Furthermore, because of the regional footing of 
shareholders or members, they are more important funding providers to individuals and 
SMEs, especially in relatively poor regions with less of a big bank presence.  
 
Our unique data set combines information from three main resources. Financial and other 
information on savings banks are obtained from the German Savings Bank Association;
5
 
regional macroeconomic statistics are provided by the German Federal Statistical Office and 
information on local banking market share of big banks and savings banks is provided by the 
                                                          
5
 We exclude Landesbanken from our sample, given their national/interregional role.  
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German Bundesbank. In total, the bank-specific data covers 457 savings banks and the 
regional and bank market share information of 440 administrative districts from 1995 to 
2004.
6 
 Matching of the data sets is not always one-to-one. In some administrative districts, 
there is more than one savings bank, and some can also operate in more than one district. In 
the first case, we simply aggregate data from the balance sheets of savings banks within the 
given district. In the second case, we only consider the region where the headquarters of the 
savings bank is located. After this procedure, we are left with 395 regions over a time span of 
10 years. Table I reports the definitions and main characteristics of the sample.  
 
[Insert Table I here] 
 
In-line with the classic literature on finance and growth (King and Levine, 1993), regional 
economic growth Yit is measured by the growth rate of regional GDP per capita 
(GDP_Capita_Growth). As a robustness test, following Guiso (2004) and Hasan, Shaffer, and 
Zhou (2009), we also use the growth rate of new business registrations 
(Business_Reg_Growth) to approximate regional industrial growth. The two measures are not 
significantly related, the correlation ratio between the two being -5.29%.  
 
In the theoretical model we employ bank monitoring costs as an indicator of the level of local 
financial development. In the empirical analysis, we use three savings bank performance 
indicators to proxy for efficiency. First, we use two indirect indicators, ROA and ROE, which 
                                                          
6
 The timeframe is mainly due to data availability issues and a ten year period we believe sufficient to test our 
model. Also in recent years, savings banks have started to offer direct banking to their customers, leading to 
some softening in the regional principle, so this also supports the use of an earlier time frame. 
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indicate that efficient banks should be more profitable. Then, from Koetter and Wedow 
(2010), who find that bank quality (proxied by cost efficiency) explains economic growth, we 
use a direct cost efficiency measure derived from stochastic cost frontier estimation. Cost 
efficiency measures show how close bank i is to the estimated industry-wide best-practice 
cost frontier in year t. As shown in Table I, the average cost efficiency for regional savings 
bank is 82.8% over the sample period (similar to earlier findings of Altunbas et al., 2001).
7
 
Details on our cost efficiency estimation methodology are provided in Appendix A2. As a 
robustness check, we employ bank Z-score as further bank efficiency proxy so as to take 
bank risk taking into consideration. Banks with higher risk-taking are less efficient in capital 
allocation and project financing. We use the bank Z-score to measure bank insolvency risk. 
The Z-Score is estimated as the ratio between the sum of a bank’s average return on assets 
and capitalization (equity/total assets) and the standard deviation of the return on assets. The 
Z-score indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s return on assets has to drop 
below its expected value before equity is depleted and the bank becomes insolvent. Banks 
with a low Z-Score indicate that the institution is exposed to higher risk.  
 
To compare the role of big versus small banks on local economic development, we present 
the market shares of two banking groups in the respective local market. Large commercial 
banks with branches all over the country belong to the big bank group (Market_Share_Big) in 
                                                          
7
 Over the study period from 1995 to 2004 there was consolidation in the savings bank sector with the number 
of banks falling from 607 to 457 (Bloch, 2008). Simple correlation of our direct cost efficiency measure with 
M&A activity per year (the latter from Table 4, p37 in Bloch, 2008) reveals an inverse relationship (- 0.4138). 
Similar relationships are found for our direct measures of efficiency. The level of M&A activity in the savings 
bank sector appears to be inversely linked to bank cost efficiency (however measured).   
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our sample, whereas savings banks are small banks that only operate in the region in which 
they are based (MS_Savings_Bank). The local market shares of the large commercial banks 
and the savings banks are calculated on the basis of the number of branches of any one bank 
in each administrative district over the total number of bank branches in the same district. 
 
GDP growth can be influenced by factors other than financial sector development, and as 
such, these need to be controlled for. First we take account of competition faced by the 
savings bank sector using the Lerner index (Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005; Carbó-
Valverde et al., 2009). The Lerner index is a non-structural measure of competition defined 
as:  
 
  
    
 
                                                                   (11) 
 
where P denotes the output price of savings bank i, and MC is their marginal cost obtained by 
differentiation of the total cost function shown in Appendix A3. The index ranges from a high 
of 1 to a low of 0, with higher values indicating greater market power. As shown in Table 1, 
the average value for the Lerner index is 0.236 over the entire sample period.
8
 
 
We also control for a variety of other macro indicators including:  inflation, the local labor 
                                                          
8
 We do not have cooperative bank data for our individual localities, so the Lerner index is calculated just for 
our sample of savings banks. We do not believe that competition between these two types of banks affects 
heterogeneity in terms of composition of the regional competition indicators, as the Lerner index of 0.236 is 
similar to that found in previous studies on German banking (see Koetter and Poghosyan, 2009; Buch et al. 
2010). 
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supply, and the absolute value of GDP per capita in a given administrative region. High 
inflation rates can result in a loss of confidence for future investments and suspend economic 
growth. We apply the annual CPI index in Germany to control for this macroeconomic shock. 
In the classical production function, output depends on two inputs, namely, capital and labor. 
Consequently, one concern of our analysis is that the results may be driven by features of the 
local labor supply not captured by a region’s financial development. We therefore include 
local labor supply (Labor_Supply) measured by the size of the regional labor force to isolate 
this effect. Rich or poor regions might have different growth patterns. We first include 
regional GDP per capita (GDP_Capita) to control for the effect of a region’s initial 
endowments. We also include a dummy variable (Group Dummy (west)) to determine 
whether a region belongs to the former West Germany before the reunification of 1990 to 
control for any potential regional bias.  
 
Furthermore, we include bank size, the equity ratio, and the percentage of non-interest 
income as bank-specific controls. Bank size (ln_Totalasset) is defined as the natural 
logarithm of total assets and is used to control for different characteristics across relatively 
large and small savings banks, as well as economies of scale. Banks with a lower equity ratio 
(Equity_Ratio) might enjoy a relatively higher return on equity, and this could generate 
biased results. Besides, this ratio reflects management’s attitude to risk, and a control for this 
variable may also adjust for this possible bias. Finally, some savings banks might focus on 
potentially higher marginal commission business, which could have a positive influence on 
bank profitability and efficiency measures. Consequently, we control for bank non-interest 
income (Share_of_Fee_Inc) to isolate this effect. Table 1 reports the summary statistics.  
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3.2.  METHODOLOGY 
The following empirical analysis seeks to test the two propositions derived from our 
theoretical model. Namely, does a more efficient local banking system promote regional GDP 
growth and is this effect larger in less developed regions? The link between finance and 
growth as first advocated by Schumpeter (1934) has spawned a significant empirical 
literature (King and Levine, 1993; Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Levine and Zervos, 1998; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Claessens and Laeven. 2003; Bekaert et al., 2005; Beck et al., 
2008). Following on from this, we test the propositions presented above using the following 
model, which examines the effect of local financial development on economic growth: 
itl
J
j
j
itjitmitit DummyYearXFinLocalYaY   

 __
1
1
                              (12)
 
where subscript i indicates regions and t indicates years. In line with the theoretical model, Yit 
stands for local economic growth. We use two proxies for Yit: the growth rate of regional 
GDP per capita and the growth rate of business registration in a certain region. Local_Finit is 
an indicator of local financial development proxied by one of three variables:  savings bank 
cost efficiency, return on total assets, and return on total equity.  As a robustness check, we 
employ bank Z-score as a further bank efficiency proxy. We also control for a variety of 
other variables, Xit, covering indicators of: local banking market competition; inflation; 
regional labor supply; bank size; share of fee income; capital strength (proxied using an 
equity ratio); and a binary variable indicating whether a region belongs to the former West 
Germany. εit is the disturbance, with vi the unobserved regional specific effect and uit the 
idiosyncratic error.  
 
A major technical challenge in the empirical finance and growth literature is how to address 
 
 
 
23 
 
potential endogeneity problems, as the use of endogenous regressors will lead to inconsistent 
and biased estimations. Following Levine et al. (2000), Beck et al. (2000), and Beck and 
Levine (2004), we employ dynamic panel estimators to address potential endogeneity 
concerns relating to the direction of causality between financial development and economic 
growth. Specifically, we use the dynamic system GMM panel estimators proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer (2005) robust 
errors. The dynamic system GMM panel estimators use lagged first-differences of the 
variables as additional instruments for equations in levels, which is more efficient than 
difference GMM estimators. 
 
3.3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
BASELINE RESULTS 
 
We first test proposition 1 presented above by estimating the direct link between regional 
bank performance and local economic growth. We estimate the baseline model in Equation 
(12) using the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust 
correction (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009). The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP 
per capita in a certain region. Savings bank efficiency is proxied by return on equity, return 
on total assets, and cost efficiency. All regressions include macroeconomic and bank specific 
controls. The GMM estimation results, shown in Table II, indicate a significantly positive 
coefficient for the bank performance variables. In all the three regression models, we treat the 
lagged dependent variable (L.GDP_Capita_Growth) and lagged bank efficiency (L.ROA, 
L.ROE, L.Cost Efficiency) as endogenous GMM style variables. The result remains robust if 
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we only apply the lagged dependent variable (L.GDP_Capita_Growth) as an endogenous 
variable. Two tests support our model specification: the null of second-order autocorrelation 
(AR(2)) is rejected, and heteroscedasticity-consistent Hansen J-tests do not reject the validity 
of our instrument set at least at the 5% level. This illustrates that small bank performance 
improvements are effective in promoting regional economic growth. The first two regression 
models that use indirect bank efficiency indicators—ROA and ROE—indicate that efficiency 
is positively associated with regional economic development:  namely, a higher level of bank 
profitability spurs region’s economic development in the following period. The final 
regression model contains the results with respect to the direct cost efficiency indicator 
derived from frontier estimation. Here the results again confirm that savings bank cost 
efficiency is associated with an increase in regional economic growth, consistent with the 
findings of Koetter and Wedow (2010). All three indicators are highly correlated with 
economic growth. As a robustness check, we employ the bank Z-score to proxy for the 
degree of bank risk taking. The results show a significantly negative relationship between 
bank risk and regional economic growth. Savings banks with higher Z_Score are positively 
correlated with regional economic growth. The results illustrate that regional savings banks 
with a lower degree of risk taking are associated with higher local economic growth rates.
9
 
Overall, these results confirm our theoretical findings and show that small regional banks are 
important fund providers in promoting local economic development.
10
 In addition, in 
regression models (4) to (6), we employ clustered standard errors to control for potential 
unobserved factors that may cause correlation of error-terms across regions. The results 
remain robust. 
                                                          
9
 The results for robustness checks are not reported here. However, they are available upon request.  
10
 Our estimations suggest divergence of growth across regions due to different initial conditions. 
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Turning to the various control variables, we see that inflation is negatively related to regional 
economic growth. This result is consistent with the notion that a higher inflation rate leads to 
uncertainty about the future profitability of investment projects and, as a result, suspends 
economic development. The Lerner index and local labor supply are not significantly 
associated with regional economic growth. Bank size, the amount of non-interest income, and 
capital strength (equity ratio) do not appear to be linked to regional economic growth in most 
model specifications. 
 
[Insert Table II here] 
 
INITIAL ENDOWMENTS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
 
We further want to test proposition 2 from the theoretical model. We assess whether the 
impact of financial development varies in regions with different initial endowments. If small 
regional banks can prevent financial resources flowing from poor to rich regions, then such 
banks will help cover local capital demand and the impact of regional bank efficiency should 
be stronger in regions with low initial endowments. We create an interaction term and add 
this variable to all the regression models. The interaction term is the product of bank 
efficiency and the initial regional GDP per capita in 1995. The introduction of this interaction 
term enables us to differentiate the relationship between savings bank efficiency and regional 
economic growth in less versus more developed regions. 
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The results presented in Table III show a significantly positive coefficient for the bank 
efficiency variables. This illustrates that savings bank efficiency improvements are effective 
in promoting regional economic growth. The coefficients of the interaction term are negative 
and highly significant, indicating that the effect is stronger in less developed regions, rather 
than in highly developed regions. This confirms our theoretical findings and shows that 
regional banks are important in promoting local economic development in poor regions. The 
results also support the theoretical findings of Lucas (1990) and Boyd and Smith (1997), who 
discuss the danger of capital flows from the poor to rich regions.  
 
Overall, our findings suggest that the presence of savings banks as regional funding providers 
is positively associated with local economic growth and that this effect is stronger in 
relatively poor regions. Small banks appear to be important funding providers in such regions 
and as such they may limit capital flows from poor to rich regions. The results are consistent 
with our theoretical model. 
 
[Insert Table III here] 
 
THE ROLE OF ACCESS TO FINANCE  
 
Without access to external finance, firms cannot get enough funding for their projects, which 
results in slower economic growth for a region. In our theory, we have shown that financing 
constraints are negatively correlated with regional economic growth, especially in regions 
with weak financial development. In this subsection, we assess whether the impact of 
regional saving banks on economic development varies in regions with different credit 
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market conditions. We employ two measures for regional access to finance: commercial bank 
branches per 100,000 residents (Branch) and private lending per capita in a certain region 
(Private_credit). We subdivide the sample according to the medians of the variable Branch. 
Regions with average commercial bank branches per 100,000 residents greater than the 
sample median are classified as markets with high access to finance. The regions with 
average commercial bank branches per 100,000 residents lower than the sample median are 
classified as markets with low access to finance. As a robustness check we also subdivide the 
sample according to the median of the variable Private_credit.  
 
Table IV contains the results. Regression models (1), (3), and (5) report results in regions 
with relatively high access to finance. Regression models (2), (4), and (6) report results in 
regions with relatively low access to finance. The significantly positive coefficients for the 
bank efficiency variables, especially in regions with low access to finance, indicate that 
regional savings banks are more important external finance providers in regions with higher 
financing constraints. This confirms our theoretical findings and shows that regional banks 
are important in promoting local economic development in regions with binding incentive 
constraint.  
 
[Insert Table IV here] 
 
SMALL BANKS vs. BIG BANKS 
We have shown that local financial development is essential for regional economic growth, 
especially in poor regions. A further interesting question is: do small banks or big banks have 
a differential impact on a region’s economic development? In order to answer this question 
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we  proxy for small and big bank presence using branch market shares of  regional savings 
banks, regional cooperative banks, and big commercial banks based on the number of 
branches in the region. The regional savings banks and regional cooperative banks represent 
small banks, while big interregional commercial banks are big banks.  So far we have used 
the growth rate of GDP per capita as a dependent variable. In the following analysis, we 
approximate regional economic development using the growth rate of new business 
registrations (Business_Reg_Growth) in a certain region as a robustness check.  A further 
advantage of this approach is that we can mitigate concerns over causality between regional 
economic growth and bank performance. Again, we use the interactive variable to 
differentiate the effect of financial development in poor versus rich regions. The interaction 
term is defined as the product of market share of big or small banks and regional GDP per 
capita. A negative sign on the interaction term will indicate that the effect is stronger in poor 
regions.  
[Insert Table V here] 
 
Estimates in Table V reveal that regions in which there is a larger market share of regional 
savings banks have higher growth in new business registrations, suggesting more prosperous 
economic conditions. As the growth rate of regional business registration mainly represents 
regional SME growth, these results confirm the findings of Carbó-Valverde et al. (2009) and 
Degryse and Ongena (2007), who show that savings banks are more effective at promoting 
SME development. We therefore find that savings banks have a positive and significant effect 
on regional development proxied by the growth rate of business registrations, and the highly 
significant negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the effect is particularly 
strong in relatively poor regions. The cooperative banks, another representative from the 
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regional banking group, exhibit similar effect on promoting regional economic development. 
The coefficient is positive but insignificant for the market share of cooperative banks, and the 
coefficient of the interaction term is negative and insignificant, indicating a higher market 
share of credit cooperatives is weakly associated with higher growth rates of new business 
registration.   
 
Our findings for large commercial banks, however, are in the opposite direction; the 
coefficients for the market share of large banks have a negative and insignificant sign and the 
coefficient for the interaction term is positive and insignificant. The results suggests that a 
higher proportion of large commercial bank branches in a given region might not improve 
regional development. A possible reason is that the presence of large commercial banks may 
crowd out small banks that have a stronger focus on local SME finance. Also, our results 
using the growth rate of new business registrations demonstrates that the effect of regional 
banks on local economic development diverges between poor and prosperous regions. This 
confirms the findings of our theoretical model, which shows that more developed regions are 
attractive for big banks due to higher initial endowments. However, in less developed regions 
with lower initial endowments, big banks only have a limited presence. In this context, big 
banks have a more positive role on local economic development for rich regions, as 
compared to poor regions. In contrast, small banks that do not have the opportunity for 
mobility are engines for local growth, especially in poor regions that face potential capital 
outflows from interregional banks. Our findings, therefore, remain robust to alternative 
measures of regional economic development (growth in GDP per capita and new business 
registrations). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
The potential role of small banks in a financially-integrated market is not obvious. Earlier 
empirical studies suggest that local financial development remains important and that there is 
a causal link between local financial development and real economic growth. In this paper, 
we investigate the influence of small banks and big banks on real economic development. 
We propose a theoretical model of financial development and economic growth. The model 
suggests that under credit rationing, rich regions are more attractive for external investments 
because of higher initial endowments and because poor regions tend to have fewer projects 
that need financing. Thus, in a financially-integrated market, capital will flow from poor to 
rich regions. Accordingly, due to the lower level of economic activity, an expansion in 
investment will have a rather high marginal productivity in poor regions. Thus, small banks 
can improve local economic development and will have a higher impact on economic growth 
in such regions. We then empirically test the roles of small banks and big banks on economic 
growth. The GMM estimations show that small bank development improves local economic 
growth, with the effect being stronger in less developed regions. Overall, both the theoretical 
and empirical parts of our analysis suggest that small banks may be effective in preventing 
capital outflows from poor to rich regions. 
 
Our analysis illustrates the important role of small regional banks in a financially-integrated 
market. Interregional bank consolidation may destroy the regional rootedness of these banks, 
turning small regional banks into big banks and thus losing the potential benefits. Small and 
regional banks play a role in many financial systems, not only Germany. For example, local 
and regional cooperative and savings banks play an important role in many European banking 
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systems, particularly in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden. In the US, banks that fall under the community reinvestment act (CRA) from 1977 
also have a regional development focus. Also in both US and UK, governments have created 
Community Development Financial Institutions. In this context, the findings have relevance 
beyond the German setting as many other European countries as well as the U.S. (community 
banks) host a variety of banks with important local or/and regional focus. 
 
Overall, our paper discusses the optimal architecture of a regional and interregional banking 
system. Financial policies that supports regional granularity may prevent a capital drain and 
thus foster development, especially in less developed regions. 
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Table I: Variable definitions and summary statistics 
 
Variable Definition N Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Key variables of interest             
Regional Economic Development 
      
GDP_Capita_Growth (%) Annual growth rate of regional gross domestic 
product per capita. 
3554 1.995 3.142 -15.983 25.484 
Business_Reg_Growth (%) 
 
Annual growth rate of regional new business 
registrations. 
 
2765 
 
1.957 
 
11.913 
 
-30.120 
 
83.260 
Bank Efficiency and Risk Taking 
     ROA (%) Return on total assets of savings banks. 3575 0.234 0.170 -3.967 2.038 
 
ROE (%) 
 
Return on total equity of savings banks. 3575 5.556 4.330 -4.045 69.300 
Cost Efficiency 
 
Cost efficiencies of savings banks estimated using 
stochastic frontier analysis. It represents a relative 
performance measure of savings banks.  
 
2776 
 
0.828 
 
0.039 
 
0.519 
 
0.919 
Z_Score 
 
Z-score is estimated as 
ROA+(equity/assets))/Sd(ROA). 
 
2870 
 
3.839 
 
21.095 
 
0.210 
 
37.503 
 
Panel B: Control variables  
  
          
Regional Specific Controls 
      
  
     
Lerner 
 
Lerner index measure of regional bank 
competition.  
2776 0.236 0.057 0.049 0.520 
Branch 
 
Bank branches  per 100,000 residents. 
 
3935 
 
49.076 
 
20.271 
 
12.918 
 
116.788 
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Private_Credit (Tds. Euro) Private credit per capita in thousand Euro. 3935 27.603 35.558 2.393 361.177 
GDP_Capita (Tds. Euro) 
 
Absolute value of regional gross domestic product 
per capita in thousand Euro. 
 
3949 
 
23.226 
 
7.782 
 
10.118 
 
74.118 
 
Inflation (%) 
 
Annual German Consumer Price Index (CPI).  3950 0.619 0.673 -0.678 1.874 
 
Labor_Supply (Mio.) 
 
Total population in a region in Million.  3950 0.233 0.188 0.040 1.736 
 
Savings_rate (%) 
 
Regional annual savings rate in percentage. 3950 10.193 1.005 6.800 12.300 
MS_Savings_Bank(%) Market share of regional savings bank branches in 
a region as a proportion of total bank branches. 
3555 34.822 6.164 8.475 61.333 
 
MS_Coop_Bank (%) 
 
Market share of regional cooperative bank 
branches in a region as a proportion of total bank 
branches. 
 
3555 
 
27.881 
 
9,696 
 
4.950 
 
58.879 
 
MS_Big_Commercial (%) 
 
Market share of large commercial bank branches 
divided by the total number of bank branches  in a 
region. 
 
3555 
 
37.297 
 
9.179 
 
12.500 
 
74.510 
 
Group Dummy (West) 
 
A dummy variable equals to one if a region 
belongs to the former West Germany.  
 
3950 
 
0.833 
 
0.373 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
Bank Specific Controls 
       
In_Totalasset Natural logarithm of savings bank total assets. 3575 6.081 0.400 4.993 7.529 
Share_of_Fee_Inc. (%) 
 
Percentage of non-interest income relative to 
interest income. 
 
3575 
 
21.311 
 
5.000 
 
6.227 
 
53.042 
Equity_Ratio (%) 
 
Equity to total assets ratios for savings banks. 3575 4.338 0.923 2.032 8.720 
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Table II: Impact of regional savings bank efficiency on local economic growth  
This table reports results from GMM estimations of the effects of small savings banks on regional economic development. The dependent variable is the growth rate of 
regional GDP per capita. The measures of savings bank efficiency include two indirect indicators—(1) ROA and (2) ROE—and a direct measure derived from stochastic 
frontier estimation, namely (3) Cost Efficiency. Regression models (1) to (3) contain results with Windmeijer (2005) small-sample two-step standard errors. Regression 
models (4) to (6) contain results with clustered standard errors. The period covers the years 1995 to 2004. *** denotes significance at the 1%-level; ** denotes significance at 
the 5%-level; * denotes significance at the 10%-level. 
      
       
 
Dependent Variable: GDP_Capita_Growth  
       
   (1)                                           (2)                                        (3)                                                (4)                                            (5)                                             (6) 
 
Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. 
             
L. GDP_Capita_Growth -0.034 0.755 -0.047 0.667 -0.055 0.470 -0.034 0.851 0.010 0.951 -0.263* 0.077 
L.ROA 2.850* 0.055 
    
2.850 0.105     
L.ROE 
  
0.116* 0.068 
  
  0.042* 0.098   
L.Cost_Eff. 
    
3.883* 0.100     -19.289** 0.013 
Lerner -4.614 0.717 -7.142 0.524 1.913 0.738 -4.614 0.767 -0.892 0.941 -16.609* 0.071 
Inflation -10.453*** 0.000 -10.323*** 0.000 -10.389*** 0.000 -10.453*** 0.000 -10.268*** 0.000 -10.176*** 0.000 
Labor_Supply -0.363 0.543 -0.302 0.586 -0.596 0.148 -0.363 0.674 -0.390 0.608 -0.183 0.804 
In_Totalasset 0.129 0.862 0.337 0.656 -0.252 0.571 0.129 0.894 0.569 0.539 0.689 0.525 
Share_of_Fee_Inc. -0.009 0.907 -0.015 0.834 0.074 0.236 -0.009 0.927 -0.021 0.813 0.157 0.176 
Equity_Ratio -0.111 0.757 0.187 0.676 0.124 0.371 -0.111 0.797 0.058 0.898 -1.356*** 0.008 
Group Dummy (west) -0.552 0.316 -0.868 0.162 0.134 0.750 -0.552 0.468 -0.616 0.404 -0.152 0.855 
_cons 12.610 0.150 10.838 0.148 7.155 0.128 12.610 0.238 8.740 0.291 29.576*** 0.001 
Year_Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of Obs. 2873  2873  2862  2873  2873  2862  
Number of Banks 367  367  366  367  367  366  
Hansen test (p-value) 0.159  0.244  0.093  0.159  0.220  0.089  
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.001  0.019  
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.766  0.844  0.906  0.839  0.690  0.224  
Clustered SE No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Table III: Initial Endowments and Regional Economic Development  
This table reports the impact of small savings banks on regional economic development with different initial 
conditions. The dependent variable is the growth rate of regional GDP per capita. The measures of savings bank 
efficiency include two indirect indicators—(1) ROA and (2) ROE—and a direct measure derived from 
stochastic frontier estimation, namely (3) Cost Efficiency.  The proxy for regional initial condition is regional 
GDP per Capita in 1995.  The period covers the years 1995 to 2004. *** denotes significance at the 1%-level; 
** denotes significance at the 5%-level; * denotes significance at the 10%-level. 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP_Capita_Growth 
  
 (1)                                       (2)                                  (3) 
             
 Coeff.             p-Val.          Coeff.          p-Val.        Coeff.              p-Val. 
       
       
L. GDP_Capita_Growth -0.229** 0.021 -0.215** 0.031 -0.318** 0.010 
L.ROA 15.923*** 0.000     
L.ROE   0.493*** 0.000   
L.Cost_Eff.     18.024*** 0.003 
ROA×(Initial GDP_Capita) -0.683*** 0.000     
ROE×(Initial GDP_Capita)   -0.022*** 0.001   
Cost_Eff.×(Initial GDP_Capita)     -1.108*** 0.000 
Lerner -9.150 0.492 -3.002 0.806 -23.589 0.159 
GDP_Capita 0.182*** 0.002 0.161*** 0.007 0.812*** 0.000 
Inflation -9.010*** 0.000 -8.682*** 0.000 -3.566** 0.040 
Labor_Supply -0.687 0.280 -0.878 0.165 0.360 0.709 
In_Totalasset 0.223 0.764 0.543 0.488 -1.721** 0.048 
Share_of_Fee_Inc. -0.016 0.854 -0.002 0.976 0.410*** 0.002 
Equity_Ratio -0.205 0.627 0.180 0.726 -0.314 0.610 
Group Dummy (west) -1.195 0.116 -1.193 0.137 1.311 0.324 
_cons 8.895 0.311 3.869 0.629 -3.788 0.748 
Year_Dummies yes  yes  yes  
Number of Obs. 2866  2866  2855  
Number of Banks 366  366  365  
Hansen test (p-value) 0.330  0.299  0.946  
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.000  0.000  0.023  
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.256  0.309  0.087  
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Table IV: The Role of Access to Finance  
This table reports results from GMM estimations of the effects of small savings banks on regional economic development under low or high access to finance. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of regional GDP per capita. The measures of savings bank efficiency include two indirect indicators—(1) ROA and (2) ROE—and a direct 
measure derived from stochastic frontier estimation, namely (3) Cost Efficiency. Regression models (1), (3), and (5) with H contain results in regions of relative high access 
to finance. Regression models (2), (4), and (6) with L contain results in regions of relative low access to finance. The period covers the years 1995 to 2004. *** denotes 
significance at the 1%-level; ** denotes significance at the 5%-level; * denotes significance at the 10%-level. 
      
       
 
Dependent Variable: GDP_Capita_Growth  
       
 (1)                                      (2)                                     (3)                                               (4)                                          (5)                                              (6) 
 H  L  H  L  H  L   
 
Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val.  
        
 
     
L. GDP_Capita_Growth -0.083 0.495 0.071 0.621 -0.243** 0.033 0.016 0.917 -0.184** 0.032 -0.140** 0.046  
L.ROA -0.612 0.866 1.542* 0.075 
  
       
L.ROE 
    
0.034 0.780 0.053 0.280      
L.Cost_Eff. 
      
  -3.535 0.489 -13.230*** 0.007  
Lerner 23.051 0.230 -27.635* 0.063 14.296 0.481 -24.171* 0.069 9.503 0.199 -15.411*** 0.002  
Inflation -8.700*** 0.000 -12.737*** 0.000 -7.488*** 0.000 -12.344*** 0.000 -9.344*** 0.000 -12.722*** 0.000  
Labor_Supply -2.777 0.154 -0.158 0.859 -1.319 0.412 -0.408 0.637 8.026** 0.022 -1.902* 0.086  
In_Totalasset -1.390 0.334 0.530 0.619 -1.017 0.506 0.907 0.386 2.088** 0.046 -0.016 0.973  
Share_of_Fee_Inc. -0.014 0.910 -0.170 0.164 0.087 0.456 -0.126 0.284 -0.128 0.183 -0.016 0.796  
Equity_Ratio -0.527 0.420 0.039 0.953 -0.685 0.323 -0.152 0.828 0.817*** 0.000 -0.103 0.704  
Group Dummy (west) 1.916* 0.061 -1.504* 0.090 1.462 0.121 -1.047 0.287 -3.912*** 0.000 -1.075** 0.011  
_cons 15.124 0.317 21.358* 0.085 12.058 0.386 17.534* 0.099 0.131 0.991 30.498*** 0.000  
Year_Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Number of Obs. 1249  1624  1249  1624   1249  1623  
Number of Banks 157  210  157  210   157  367  
Hansen test (p-value) 0.763  0.850  0.505  0.820   0.267  0.129  
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.002  0.000  0.006  0.000   0.000  0.000  
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.548  0.290  0.073  0.433   0.150  0.791  
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Table V: Small vs. Big Banks 
This table compares the impact of small vs. big bank presence on local economic development. The dependent 
variable is growth rate of regional business registration. The proxies for small and big bank presence in a certain 
region are the market shares of the regional savings banks and big commercial banks based on the number of 
branches. The period covers the years 1995 to 2004. *** denotes significance at the 1%-level; ** denotes 
significance at the 5%-level; * denotes significance at the 10%-level. 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Business Registration    
       
 Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. Coeff. p-Val. 
       
 (1)                        (2)                      (3)   
       
L.Business_Registration 0.235 0.171 -0.270 0.125 -0.040 0.820 
MS_Savings_Bank 1.289** 0.024     
MS_Saving × GDP_Capita -0.041** 0.029     
MS_Coop_Bank   0.065 0.799   
MS_Coop × GDP_Capita   0.001 0.916   
MS_Big_Commercial     -0.263 0.367 
MS_Big × GDP_Capita     0.005 0.588 
GDP_Capita 1.421** 0.029 0.030 0.894 -0.131 0.715 
Inflation -3.969 0.787 -47.318*** 0.001 -26.565* 0.072 
Labor_supply -2.452 0.142 2.821 0.170 2.364 0.228 
Savings_rate 0.364 0.548 0.827 0.137 0.788 0.106 
Group Dummy (west) 0.458 0.850 -6.617** 0.044 -6.894** 0.024 
Year_Dummies yes  yes  yes  
Constant -29.914 0.315 56.043*** 0.001 47.143*** 0.004 
Number of observations 1975  1975  1975  
Hansen test (p-value)  0.234  0.352  0.297 
AB test AR(1) (p-value)  0.000  0.009  0.001 
AB test AR(2) (p-value)  0.154  0.469  0.681 
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A. Appendix 
A.1. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1: We need to differentiate between the two cases, with and without 
binding incentive constraint (IC). If the constraint does not bind, Equation (9) applies. In each 
period, the number of firms is independent from last period’s level. As a consequence, output 
is identical, thus there is no growth. If (IC) does bind, Equation (6) applies, and nt depends on 
last period’s wage level Wt–1, and hence from the initial endowment At = Wt–1. Output at date t 
is Yt = β Kt
α
 = β nt
α
 (pHR – c)
α
. Now the previous period’s output Yt−1 is independent of 
today’s cost c, and hence, we only need to consider ∂Yt/∂c instead of ∂(Yt − Yt−1)/∂c.  
 
An increase in regional lending Ft now directly increases the number of projects in the region. 
Ft = nt (I − At), and hence, nt = Ft/(I − At). More projects produce more capital such that Kt = 
nt (pH R − c). Hence, output Yt increases. Because c is negatively associated with Ft, the 
partial derivative with respect to c is negative, ∂(Yt − Yt−1)/∂c < 0. This proposition also holds 
true in the absence of credit rationing. Only the multiplier is smaller because outside finance 
crowds out inside finance, and hence, nt = Ft/I.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: According to (6), nt is an increasing function in At. According to (7), 
Wt increases in nt, and hence, it also increases in At. If (8) fails to hold, there is no credit 
rationing. In that case, Wt does not depend on At. 
 
Take the derivative dWt/dFt, which is positive. Then consider this derivative at different 
values of At. If the derivative is smaller for higher values of At, the first part of the proof is 
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complete. Noting that (2), (3), and nt = Ft/(I − At) yields 
           
         
    
                                      (13) 
The derivative with respect to Ft  is 
 
   
   
 
              
    
 
         
    
                       (14) 
According to this term, ∂Wt/∂Ft is larger for larger At. However, one needs to take into 
account that the natural (or equilibrium) number of projects (and thus the amount of regional 
finance) also depends on At. Considering Ft = nt (I – At) and (5) yields 
 
   
   
           
     
    
                                                     (15) 
Hence, the two effects cancel out exactly. However, this result holds true only if (8) holds and 
the incentive constraint thus binds. In more developed regions, nt = Ft/I, and hence, the first 
effect is weaker. In this case ∂Wt/∂Ft is smaller for larger At. Since F depends on bank 
efficiency c ∂Wt/∂(–c) is smaller for larger At, which completes the proof.  
 
A.2. Bank Cost Efficiency 
Following Berger and Mester (1997), the cost frontier is specified as a Fourier-flexible 
functional form for each year t in our analysis: 
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(16) 
where 
ln TC = the natural logarithm of total costs (operating plus financial cost); 
ln Qi = the natural logarithm of bank outputs including bank loans, securities, and off-balance 
sheet items; 
ln Pl = the natural logarithm of input prices including wage rate, interest rate and physical 
capital price; 
T = time trend; 
Zi= the adjusted values of the log output ln Qi such that they span the interval [0, 2π]; 
a, β, δi, γ, φ, θ, ρ, a, b and t are coefficients to be estimated. 
 
We use the stochastic cost frontier approach to generate annual estimate of cost efficiency for 
each bank. The sample covers 457 regional savings banks from 1994 to 2005. As shown in 
Table 1, the average cost efficiency for regional savings bank in Germany is 82.8% over the 
entire sample period. 
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